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T HIS study concerns itself with one of the most important,
needy, and until recently neglected socio-legal fields,-protec-
tion of children in divorce cases. It need not be argued here that,
generally spealdng, the divorce or voluntary separation of parents
is likely to imperil the welfare of their young children. There are
instances where children are better off when rid of an unfit father
or mother or both. These call attention to the fact that the real cause
of the sorry plight of children of divorce is often a bad family en-
vironment long preceding the breaking up of the home. But even
in such cases relief from emotional or moral evils is usually ac-
companied with new problems of support, training and education.
Nature provides the child with two parents, each normally perform-
ing functions which the other cannot take on so well if at all; and
the two joining in much that can be better done together. When
from any cause the total duties of parenthood fall upon a single
parent the child loses something valuable; but his disadvantage is
plainly greater when there is divorce" than when the loss occurs
through death or necessary absence, because of the psychological
disturbance incident to an atmosphere of domestic discord. Damage
is likely to have been done before the case comes into court; and
divorce and its aftermath often continue and sometimes increase the
ill effect of previous disharmony. The child in every divorce case
has therefore ipso facto a status of disadvantage which challenges
the judge, and opens to him the duty to reduce it so far as possible.
This prestimption of disadvantage finds ample confirmation in
the experience of judges, lawyers, clergymen, psychiatrists, and so-
cial workers. Everybody knows that practically all children who
come into the juvenile courts as "dependent" or "neglected" are
without two parents who are on the job. This is true of a large
proportion of the "delinquents"-approximately one-third; and
*Judge of the District Court, 4th Judicial District of Minnesota, 1911-
1941 (retired), with Juvenile Court assignment 1911-1921 and 1931-1941.
Municipal Judge, Minneapolis, 1905-1911. Chairman of Minnesota Child
Welfare Commission, 1917.
1. Unless otherwise indicated, the term "divorce" is used herein to in-
clude separate maintenance and annulment of marriage.
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while it cannot be assumed that in all these cases lack of normal
home environment is the prime cause of delinquency, nevertheless
it is doubtless one factor. The calamity which has befallen these
children has included all varieties and combinations of the negative
evils of economic and emotional loss due to the mere absence of
one of the two parents essential to a normal home, and the positive
evils of conscious insecurity, divided filial allegiance, the shocks and
embarrassments of recognized parental discord, and the ruinous
mental conflicts which develop when hostile parents compete for
the child's affection.
Official duty and public concern for these unfortunates have been
slow to furnish adequate protection. Long ago English Chancery
developed the theory that, representing the Crown as parens patriae,
it was charged with supervision of the interests of those not com-
petent to care for themselves, including minor children; but cen-
turies passed before this principle was applied to minors when prop-
erty interests were not at stake. In the United States the socialized
attitude of the courts made more rapid progress and may be said
to have reached the moaern stage in 1899, when the first juvenile
court was established in Chicago. This court emphasized the chan-
cery principle of guardianship of children and extended it to law-
breakers under sixteen years of age, dealing with them as erring or
"delinquent" children who were objects of the law's protective and
constructivc solicitude, rather than criminal victims of retributive
justice. The idea spread and in addition to the rapid establishment
of juvenile courts throughout the land there were soon instituted a
few "courts of domestic relations," having varying jurisdiction
within the implications of that term. As early as 1914 one of these
in Ohio (Hamilton Co., including the city of Cincinnati) was given
divorce jurisdiction, and this was repeated in two other counties
in 1918 and 1919.
In 1917 a committee of the National Probation Association, of
which Judge Hoffman of the Cincinnati Court of Domestic Rela-
tions was chairman, recommended the general establishment of
"family courts" with jurisdiction as follows: "(a) Cases of deser-
tion and non-support; (b) Paternity cases, . . .; (c) All matters
arising under acts pertaining to ... courts, however designated in
the several states, having within their jurisdiction the care and
treatment of delinquent and dependent children and the prosecu-
tion of adults responsible for such delinquency and dependency;
(d) All matters pertaining to adoption and guardianship of the
19481
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person of children; (e) All divorce and alimony matters." The
sound ideas underlying this grouping were the interest of the State
in the conservation of childhood, the intimate relation of all justici-
able matters directly involving family life, and the need for ad-
ministrative aid in the wise solution of such questions.
Concerning the general scheme Dean Roscoe Pound made the
following discriminating comments: "The main work of the courts
is with the economic activities of the community-in a large sense
property and contract. Next to that comes injuries to personality
through the aggression or negligence of others. In these cases the
administration of justice calls for rules or standards applied ac-
cording to a settled technique. On the other hand, in the class of
cases belonging to a domestic relations court the technique of appli-
cation of legal rules has more of an administrative character. At-
tempts to deal with these cases along the lines of property and con-
tract have failed. We have had to recognize that common sense and
experience backed up by administrative facilities and a staff of
social investigators, and even, perhaps, a psychological laboratory,
are required for a proper administration of justice in this field. This
does not mean that we should make the mistake of setting up sepa-
rate courts of hard and fast jurisdiction, but rather that in our
courts of general jurisdiction we should make provision for spe-
cialist judges handling this group of cases as a unit. In the end it
is wasteful for a man whose time is primarily given to that portion
of the administration of justice which has to do with interests of
substance to turn from time to time to fragments of situations call-
ing for a different sort of treatment and involving different inter-
ests, and endeavor to deal with them through a different technique.
The chances are infinite that he will do what, by and large, most
of our judges have done, namely, apply the habits and methods
of property law and commercial law to the solution of problems of
human conduct."
This is the clear and moderate statement of a philosophical ju-
rist. The present writer, after many years of judicial responsibility
for child and family welfare, must speak with greater emphasis.
Experience shows that in cases which fall within Dean Pound's
third category, judicial specialization is highly desirable, and the
assistance of expert social workers is always useful and often essen-
tial to any assurance of wise action. Where either technique is
available, to ignore it habitually is to play fast and loose with sacred
human interests. Nor should the cooperation of social workers be
[Vol. 32:766
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rejected even when they cannot be classed as "expert." With neg-
ligible exceptions they are intelligent and deeply interested; and
since they can make contacts not open to the judge they are likely
to find new and relevant facts which may prove of great importance.
It is too late to question this after fifty years of the juvenile court;
and custody issues in divorce cases call for juvenile court methods,
as is well settled by experience, approved by high authorities and
expressly recognized by statute in several states, including Minne-
sota.2 The judge who after the abundant demonstrations of the
last half-century despises the aid of social agencies, and fancies
that he can always rely on his own perspicacity in observations
from the bench, or on the sound judgment of a "good" parent who
is under the stress of a marital cataclysm, fails to appreciate one of
his most important responsibilities. 3
In respect to judicial specialization perhaps a word on the posi-
tive side should be added to Dean Pound's analysis. Willingness of
a judge to give special attention to socio-legal matters implies an
interest without which the work would be unendurable and illy
performed; and there is, of course, valuable education in such a
focalized experience. The net result of the specialization Dean
Pound favors would therefore seem likely to produce, in the long
run, judges who are peculiarly fitted to deal with human problems.
And in saying this the writer is not unmindful of the dangers of too
great release from the techniques of ordinary trial procedure.
In the summer of 1916 Governor J. A. A. Burnquist appointed
a commission to study the need for revising the laws of Minnesota
which directly concerned children, and to formulate new proposals
which might be found necessary. Forty-one bills were submitted to
the 1917 legislature and thirty-five were enacted. The report of
the commission contains the following paragraph: "There is a
recent tendency to centralize all judicial dealing with family condi-
tions in a court of domestic relations, exercising the functions of a
juvenile court and dealing also with desertion and other phases of
disturbed domestic life. There is evidence enough in favor of this
experiment to entitle it to further attention before the work of
reconstructing our Minnesota children's laws can be deemed to be
completed." 4 No legislation to this effect was recommended, nor
2. Minn. Stat. 1945, Sec. 487.3(7) and (8). See also Williams v. Guynes,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1936) 97 S. W. 2d 988.
3. See article by William D. Cochran, former Judge, 19th Judicial Dis-
trict of Kentucky, in Kentucky State Bar Journal, Sept., 1947, condensed
in The Child, Vol. 12, No. 3.
4. Report of Minnesota Child Welfare Commission, 1917, p. 19.
1948]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
any other measure specially designed to safeguard the interests of
children in divorce proceedings. However, the "family court" idea
began to be discussed among those who were interested in new
attempts to relate the state's authority more closely to social mal-
adjustments, and in 1920 the State Conference of Social Work
appointed a committee to study the subject. In Ramsey County
divorce cases where there were young children involved were al-
ready being heard by the judge in charge of the juvenile court
through a voluntary agreement among the district court judges,
thus securing important features of the most advanced family
courts. The Conference committee prepared a bill designed to
implement a similar arrangement in each county where it should
be approved by the district court and county commissioners. This
measure received support from welfare organizations and informal
judicial approval in Hennepin and St. Louis Counties. The prevail-
ing sentiment of the bar was against it. It was introduced in the
1921 legislature and favorably reported out of committee in each
house, but was never brought to vote. Since 1921 no similar legis-
lation has been seriously urged, although there has been a very
great advance in socialization of the attitude of judges, practicing
lawyers and the public.
PRESENT LAW AND PRACTICE
Much attention has been given to our subject in other states.
Local needs have been studied and remedies applied which in some
instances have gone far beyond the experimental stage. We shall
consider relevant laws and facts as they now exist in Minnesota,
and insofar as conditions are found which appear less than satis-
factory, present, by way of helpful suggestion, some methods
adopted elsewhere.
In Minnesota, as generally, when there is a decree of annul-
ment of marriage, separate maintenance of the wife or divorce of
the parties, the law gives discretion to the court to award custody
of a minor child and to determine and enforce parental responsi-
bility for its care and support. The natural rights of parents are to
be respected, but the welfare of the child is the prime consideration,
and in this respect the decree remains subject to revision. On ap-
pellate review of a decree or order for custody much confidence
will of course be placed in the conclusions of the trial court, but
if abuse of discretion is found the Supreme Court will not hesitate
to interfere in the interest of the child. As between the parents
there is a presumption in favor of the mother as the fit custodian
[Vol. 32:766
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for a child of tender years, but this yields to contrary evidence.
Divided custody between the parents is recognized as sometimes
appropriate, but is commonly viewed with disfavor. "As a general
rule divided custody of such a child [four or five years old in the
case under consideration] is not for its best interest; and if the
mother is a fit and proper person, and able to and does properly
care for the child, she should have its custody and care." 5 When
the parents agree as to placement of a child their wish will be
carefully considered but is not conclusive.
Except as modified by decree or order the common-law obliga-
tion of the father to support his children continues after divorce,
and is not limited, as is alimony to the wife, to one-third of his
income. Permanent abandonment of dependent children is a felony,
and failure to support, without intent to abandon, a misdemeanor.
The prohibition of special legislation in the Minneiota constitu-
tion has not prevented marked diversity in the organization and
functions of juvenile courts throughout the state. These courts are
so large a factor' in our problem that the existing situation must be
presented with some detail.
In Hennepin, Ramsey and St. Louis Counties, containing the
three large cities of Minneapolis, St. Paul and Duluth, the district
court has exclusive jurisdiction in juvenile cases. In other couri-
ties the probate court functions as the juvenile court to a limited
degree, but only to determine the status of the child as dependent,
neglected or delinquent and designate a guardian."
In Hennepin County a district judge is nominated and elected
on a separate ballot whose duty, taking precedence of all others, is
to have charge of the juvenile court. In Ramsey and St. Louis
Counties the district judges are required to designate one, and if
necessary two, of their number to act as judge of the juvenile court
for one year unless otherwise ordered.
In every juvenile court some provision is made for probation
officers for investigation and supervision under the direction of
the judge; and in Hennepin County these officers are by statute
expressly placed at the disposal of all the district judges, for any
required service in behalf of children in divorce cases.
Jurisdiction in cases involving children is scattered and over-
lapping. The district court, with exclusive jurisdiction of divorce,
5. McDermott v. McDermott, (1934) 192 Minn. 32, 34, 255 N. W. 247.
6. The jurisdiction over "contributory delinquency," sought to be con-
ferred by Minn. Stat. 1945, Secs. 260.27 and 260.28, has been declared uncon-
stitutional by the Attorney General; Opinion Mar. 31, 1932.
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separation and annulment, virtually appoints guardians through
commitments to custody, while guardians are also appointed by
district and probate judges acting under the juvenile court law,
and by probate courts in their regular capacity. Criminal prosecu-
tions for abandonment are in the district court; for non-support
in municipal courts, before justices of the peace and often in the
district court through the reduction of an original charge of aban-
donment. Non-support may also be dealt with as contempt in three
district-juvenile courts after jurisdiction of a child has been as-
sumed through an adjudication.
Adoption and establishment of paternity are in the district
court,7 but support by illegitimate fathers may also be enforced in
three district-juvenile and three probate-juvenile courts.
We thus see that Minnesota statutes in the field with which we
are concerned have little unity or coordination. This, on the nega-
tive side, tends to reduce the sense of social responsibility felt by
the judges in divorce cases, and to keep them in ignorance of facts
in the family history which ought to be considered; and on the
positive side it often results in the regrettable confusion which fol-
lows when trial judges with co-ordinate jurisdiction take incon-
sistent action on practically identical issues.
In 1921-2 a study was made of 89 divorce cases in Hennepin
County, taken at random from those begun in those years, under
the direction of the University of Minnesota Training Course for
Social Work. The report8 shows 239 children, nearly all under 15
years of age. It was observed that due to overlapping jurisdiction
and the system of rotating assignment the judges who heard the
cases were at a great disadvantage in dealing with the family prob-
lems which concerned these children so intimately because they
were not advised of various phases which had previously arisen
in other courts or before other judges of the 4th District. In 19
cases the family had appeared in the district, municipal and juvenile
courts; 37 others had been in two courts; 37 had been in the juvenile
court and in two-thirds of this group the delinquencies dealt with
were those of the parents rather than the children.
Divorce conditions in the United States are widely criticized.
We shall not discuss nor even mention notorious evils. An ac-
credited student of public affairs has said recently that "in the
whole administration of justice there is nothing that even remotely
7. Under Rule 6 of the 4th District, adoption cases are referred to
the Judge in charge of the Juvenile Court.
S. See Mildred D. .%udgett in The Family, Vol. 4, No. 3.
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can compare in terms of rottenness with divorce proceedings."
For our present purpose we accept the substantive law as it is,-
and it is far better in Minnesota than in some states,--and are con-
cerned only with the protection of the children involved. An esti-
mate sufficiently accurate for our purpose is that there are young
children in about one-half the divorce cases which come into court
throughout the United States. The 1947 World Almanac reports
502,000 divorces in 1945,--one to every 3.2 marriages! Let us
assume that in 250,000 of these there was at least a single child.
Here, as in all the groups of cases we have mentioned as involving
children, the court must deal with a family situation. It seems clear
that this can best be done when the picture is seen as a whole, and
that-other things being equal-there is an advantage in having all
its aspects that come into court presented in the same tribunal. We
have in Minnesota no legislative plan designed to secure this ad-
vantage. Whatever steps have been taken to this end have been
purely voluntary.
DEFAULTS
In Minnesota 7,808 divorces were granted in 1946 and 5,705
in 1947. Our judges doubtless tried to give protection to children
in these cases when they knew the facts. In contested cases the facts
are likely to come out if the contest is a genuine one-as often it is
not; but in the vast majority of cases which, no defense being inter-
posed, are heard pro confesso, no full showing of relevant facts
will be made unless through direct or indirect intervention by the
judge himself. The estimate accepted by Mr. Justice Black in the
second Williams case10 that 85 per cent of divorces in the United
States are uncontested is probably conservative. An expert study
of divorces granted in Hennepin and Ramsey Counties, 1929-
1932, 1 found only 10.2% even nominally contested; and it was
suggested that in many of these the contest did not go "beyond the
filing of an answer to expedite the suit." A district judge in Hen-
nepin County is thus quoted: "The default divorce is a divorce
by mutual consent in all but rare instances. The suit is filed; with it
an affidavit of no answer; it is placed on the default divorce cal-
endar; three persons appear to testify to the 'cruelty' alleged; an
order is drawn and signed-and that's all there is to it. Of the 1,117
divorces granted in the last year 53 were contested by answers
filed to the original suits. When the contested cases came to trial
9. Reginald Heber Smith, Dishonest Divorce, The Atlantic, Dec., 1947.
10. Williams v. North Narolina, (1945) 325 U. S. 226, 65 S. Ct. 1092.
11. Calvin F. Schmid, Social Saga of Two Cities, (1937).
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only 32 defendants appeared. So for all purposes there were 1,085
divorces by mutual consent." The writer feels quite safe in saying,
on the basis of observation and experience during the years covered
by Dr. Schmid's study, that in these 1,085 cases the judge was
little more than a figure-head, being careful-at the most-that the
record should contain a prima facie basis for the decree. Often the
amount of alimony and support money and the disposition of the
children were covered by undisclosed agreements between the
parties; otherwise the wishes of the plaintiff as submitted to the
judge were almost always adopted without any facts which the
plaintiff's attorney did not choose to present. The good judgment
and conscience of the plaintiff and counsel were the only safe-
guards of the children's interests, and-to put it mildly--were not
always adequate. Often the sum ordered to be contributed for sup-
port, determined in this one-sided way, was more than the father
could possibly pay and acrimonious disputes ensued, taking much
time of the court which full knowledge of the facts at the original
hearing would have saved; often the order was not accompanied
with provisions for enforcement, and again court time was wasted,
sometimes with an interim expense to the public for emergency
relief; often the children were committed to the custody of unfit
persons in ignorance of the real facts; often a change of circum-
stances, such as remarriage of one of the parents, led to an appli-
cation for change of custody, and then the luckless children, caught
between the upper and nether millstones of bitter controversy,
needed protection from the court which the judge was not equipped
to give.
It can hardly be emphasized too much that default cases, where
the dangers we are considering are most likely to threaten, make
up an overwhelming proportion of all divorces. Taking another
example here at home: on the basis of a record of 887 consecutive
cases assigned to him in regular order during 112 months next
prior to May 1947, District judge Gustavus Loevinger of St. Paul
estimates that more than nine-tenths of the divorces granted are
uncontested.12 We find in Tennessee a recent example of conditions
elsewhere. In 1946 an investigation made by a committee of the
Chattanooga Bar Association showed that out of 985 divorce cases
tried in 1945 by a circuit judge of Hamilton County there was no
answer in 68 per cent, and an actual contest in less than 10 per
12. See his illuminating series of articles on divorce in St. Paul Pioneer
Press, Sunday editions, July and August, 1947. His estimate is confirmed by
Marshall and May, The Divorce Court, Vol. 1, p. 226.
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cent. It was stated in the committee's report that on a recent Satur-
day morning Judge ................ granted 12 divorces in seventeen
minutes! The committee is careful to say that it does not "impugn
the motives of Judge , whom we all know to be the very
soul of honor. He is truly the friend of everyone and deserves the
respect of all." (One wonders if there were in the twelve cases
any children to receive the friendly attention of the honorable
judge.) Probably Minnesota cannot match this record, but most
lawyers with memories of practice going back fifteen or twenty
years will recall some pretty fast work.
PROTECTION IN MINNESOTA IS INADEQUATE
How well does Minnesota avoid the dangers and fulfill the needs
to which we have given attention? Local conditions vary so greatly
that they must be considered separately.
From 1935 to 1941 the writer, then judge in charge of the
juvenile court of Hennepin County, took all other cases involv-
ing children except criminal prosecutions and contested divorces.
This was done through a voluntary arrangment with his colleagues.
The plan received universal approval and had loyal support from the
bar and social agencies. Not only could children be better safe-
guarded by the court than under the former practice of assigning
divorce trials in rotation, but a considerable number of reconcilia-
tions were effected,-counsel cooperating almost without exception
when they were not convinced that this would be useless or not for
the children's good. A new juvenile court judge took charge in
1941 and the same arrangement was continued until 1945, when
default divorces and motions for custody and support went back
to the general and special calendars, with assigmnents among ten
judges for two months' periods. This was regarded as a retrogres-
sive step by the bar, social workers and the informed public. A
representative group, the directors of the Legal Aid Society, passed
the following resolution and sent it to each district judge: "The
experience of the Legal Aid Society has demonstrated that in divorce
cases where there are young children their interest is best served
by the assignment of such cases for a substantial period to a single
Judge. The Directors of the Society therefore recommend to the
District Judges that the practice of the Court in this regard as it
existed for several years subsequent to 1935 be resumed." One
judge responded and pointed out the difficulty of inducing any
judge to spend all his time, or even part of his time regularly, on
domestic relations matters. The suggestion has not been followed
1948]
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further than that for convenience a judge has sometimes kept de-
faults for longer than his two months' assignment.
Aid from the social organizations remains available when de-
sired. In divorce and criminal cases involving the support of chil-
dren there is general use of the probation office to enforce collec-
tion. The potential value of this practice is disclosed by the follow-
ing comment found in a probation office report: "A great many
individual social problems are present, in varying degrees, in the
majority of cases.... Our function in relation to these problems
is far more important and requires much more time than the mere
duty of enforcing an order for support.... In finally evaluating the
results of this supervision of domestic matters there can be little
doubt that much more is accomplished in the solution of human
problems than may be indicated in any financial showings." In-
vestigation preliminary to orders and decrees is rarely made. In
1947 there were 36. Only one was ordered in an uncontested case,
where the need was likely to be greatest.
It will be recalled that in Hennepin County continuity of serv-
ice of the juvenile court judge is secured by statute. In Ramsey and
St. Louis Counties there has also been a substantial degree of per-
manence through willingness of judges to accept the assignment
for longer than the year required by law; but since judge Orr's
retirement in 1930 divorce cases in Ramsey County have taken their
regular course in rotation among eight judges. Cases where there
are young children are often referred to the county probation office
or a private social agency for preliminary investigation and, when
deemed necessary, for supervision after an award of custody,-
the practice of the judges differing, however, in this regard. In
Duluth there were only two juvenile court judges from 1905 to
1943. There has been no centralization of divorce cases. Investiga-
tion preliminary to orders for custody appears to be only occasional,
-chiefly when there is a contest for the child. Collections of
support money are referred to the probation office and some inci-
dental supervision after divorce is thus secured.
In the other 84 counties of the state conditions in our field are
found to vary, as might be expected, according to density and
character of population; number, temperament and social attitude
of the district judges; availability of extra-judicial cooperation and
other local factors. Out of nineteen judicial districts there is but a
single judge in each of nine, comprising thirty-six counties. Five
districts, with twenty-six counties, have two judges each; one,
[Vol. 32:766
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with nine counties, three judges, and one, with ten counties, four
judges. While juvenile court jurisdiction remains in the probate
courts it is plain that there can be no useful specialization in these
sixteen districts, except to a limited extent in counties containing
cities of substantial size.13
In few counties other than Hennepin, Ramsey and St. Louis,
are there trained probation officers or social agencies with skilled
executives. Churches, schools and county welfare boards are prac-
tically all the administrative aids open to a judge who is dealing
with a social problem, however conscious he may be of need. That
need is of course much less frequent in rural and small urban com-
munities than in large centers of population; though when it does
occur the human interests at stake are no less vital.14 The typical
family status is likely to be more stable, and when disturbed less
complicated; and the judge's personal acquaintance with the char-
acter, record and environment of parties, to which he may prop-
erly refer in the exercise of his discretion, is more frequently ade-
quate.
This survey of the needs of children of divorce in Minnesota,
and the supply of those needs by laws and court procedure, may
be thus summarized: In the three judicial districts containing the
largest cities and separately organized juvenile courts, the selec-
tion and education through experience of a judge for specialized
service is not now carried beyond the statutory juvenile-court
assignment. The law provides (484.34, Stats. 1945) that the busi-
ness of the courts "may be divided among the judges .. .as they
13. E.g., the following rules recently adopted by the judges of the 7thDistrict:
"No action for divorce or separate maintenance shall be heard
upon its merits within thirty days following service of summons,
and after July 1st, 1948, all default divorce cases shall be placed upon
the calendar and heard only at general term, and in all such default
divorce proceedings a stenographic record shall be taken and tran-
scribed by the official reporter, a minimum fee of Five Dollars to be
paid such reporter by the moving party."
"Proceedings to reopen and to modify judgment in divorce
matters, whether pertaining to alimony and property settlement or to
the custody, maintenance and support of minor children, shall be
heard by the judge upon whose order such decree was docketed if
such judge then continues to hold judicial office in this district,
unless he be then incapacitated by illness."
14. In 1946 and 1947 divorces granted in cotnties containing Minnesota's
six largest cities comprised 62 and 66 per cent, respectively, of the state's
official total; and doubtless there was considerable overflow, through our
easy change of venue, into adjacent counties. For example, in Carver Co.,
with a population of 17,606 (1940) there were 160 divorces in 1946 and 69
in 1947. The averages for the 2 years, respectively, in 21 other counties of
between 15,000 and 20,000 were 23.7 and 10.8.
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by rule or order may direct." They are, however, hardly likely to
impose distasteful work on a colleague indefinitely or for a long
period; but there can be specialization if a judge can be found
who is willing to do the work with substantial permanency, pro-
vided his colleagues are willing to surrender to him appropriate
cases which in the customary rotation would fall to them. The diffi-
culty lies, for obvious reasons, in the first of these conditions. Con-
sent of colleagues may be assumed; few persons with the back-
ground, personal characteristics and ambitions likely to be found
in successful candidates for the district bench would object to be-
ing relieved of cases involving family quarrels and miscellaneous
child-welfare problems. In St. Paul and Duluth the majority of
the judges have in their own hands an important first step, for they
make the juvenile court assignment. 15 In Minneapolis, as we have
seen, this is done by popular vote on a special ballot; and the
Governor in an initial appointment to fill a vacancy, or the voters
at an election, may take into account the willingness and fitness of
a candidate for juvenile court judge to assume the full duties of a
family court. In other counties and under present laws judicial spe-
cialization does not offer a path to improved conditions. The reliance
must be on the individual judge's sense of social responsibility and
willingness to seek aid from lay sources, of which the one most
generally available is the county welfare board. 6
Inquiries recently directed by the State Director of Social Wel-
fare to the chairmen of county welfare boards elicited interesting
information. Of the 84 counties outside the three metropolitan
centers replies were received from 83. In 5 counties it is customary
for the judge to order investigation or supervision, or both, in
divorce cases involving young children; in 30 this is done occasion-
ally; in 46 not at all.y7 Sixty-two boards consider this service de-
sirable; two think otherwise, and nineteen do not express an
opinion. Nine boards customarily make collections under court
orders; 29 occasionally, 42 not at all. Nowhere are there organized
social agencies available to the court other than the welfare board.
In 3 districts comprising 11 counties and served each by a single
judge the boards have not been called upon for any assistance al-
15. One of the two assignments authorized for St. Louis County is
apportioned to the Iron Range (Virginia and Hibbing).
16. By Minn. Stat. 1945, Sec. 260.08, the services of the board are placed
at the disposal of the probate-juvenile courts.




though divorces in the districts in 1946-47 numbered 488. In the
total of 46 counties so reporting there were 2,399 divorces during
the same period. Of these more than 2,100, with approximately a
thousand children, were probably defaults. Aside from more im-
portant points, it would be interesting to know how many of these
divorces were virtually subsidized out of public funds through aid
to dependent children, because all the facts were not disclosed at the
trial.
SUGGESTIONS FROM OTHER STATES
The statutes of all the states excepting South Carolina provide
for judicial divorce; and everywhere but in Pennsylvania there is
statutory provision for custody and support of children as inci-
dental to divorce proceedings. A few courts have specific statutory
rules for adjusting custody between contending parents. Some of
these are quite archaic and in none do we find useful suggestions
for Minnesota. Many states recognize the duty of the court to
affirmatively secure and maintain for young children the protection
they should have received in the homes into which they were born.
Legislative steps to this end indicate trends of public opinion and
areas of experience which invite our attention.
Family courts, or courts of domestic relations, have spread to
at least twenty states, for the most part under local laws by which
they serve only counties which contain the larger cities. Some have
been granted divorce jurisdiction,-e.g., in Iowa, Missouri, Nebras-
ka,"3 North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Wis-
consin and West Virginia. These represent an effort to secure for
the children of divorce contact with an interested and informed
judge, qualified through special and enlarged experience. Along
with this approach there have been extended to these children
methods found useful in the juvenile courts in obtaining facts
needed for thoroughly adequate court action, and in making sure
that during the period of the court's responsibility its orders, as
modified on the basis of changing conditions, are obeyed. 19
18. In Nebraska divorce jurisdiction is expressly granted to the
juvenile court. Rev. Stats. '43, 43.203. Most of these details as to statutory
provisions in other states are from a compilation of laws of all the states
relating to divorce made by the United States Children's Bureau, which
originally covered 1940 and has been brought down to include later legisla-
tion in some but not all of the states. The writer does not profess to have
made an up-to-date study of divorce laws in the United States, his purpose
being not to compile a digest, even of relevant material, but find useful sug-
gestions.
19. No instance has been found where divorce jurisdiction once granted
to a juvenile court or court of domestic relations has been withdrawn except
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The legislatures of many states have recognized the need of
giving protection to young children beyond the routine procedure
of the divorce court. This has been done in many ways, with the
common purpose to make sure that all relevant facts are brought
before the court. Probation offices and other public agencies are ex-
pressly placed at the disposal of the court if required; and in
Nebraska we find the following mandatory provision: "It shall be
the duty of the court to make independent investigations of the
merits of all default cases and cases where minor children are in-
volved, through a probation officer or county superintendent of
child welfare or other agency." 20 Often it is made discretionary
with the court, and sometimes obligatory, to appoint counsel to
represent the interest of the public in divorce proceedings. In some
states this duty devolves on the county attorney, on whom service
of pleadings is required. Wisconsin provides for the appointment
of "divorce counsel" in every county, who must appear at the trial
whenever the case is to be heard pro confesso. In such cases no
final decree may be filed until he has seen a copy.2' In several states
it is made the express duty of the court and of counsel appearing
for the public to undertake to reconcile the parties.
Michigan's "Friend of the Court" plan22 has been in successful
operation many years, and has received wide publicity. In each
judicial circuit the court recommends and the Governor appoints
a proctor styled "Friend of the Court" to enforce payment of sup-
port money and otherwise protect the interests of minor children
in divorce cases. In Detroit this official may act as referee to take
testimony and make recommendations.
Since 1939 California has had a unique device. In each district
the superior court may designate one judge annually to have charge
of what is called "The Children's Court of Conciliation." The juris-
diction of this court may be invoked by either spouse to preserve
in Hamilton County, Tenn. (Chattanooga), where this occurred evidently
through a legislative inadvertence. Reinstatement is recommended in the
Bar Committee's report to which reference has been made. See Chattanooga
Times, Nov. 24, 1946. On the recommendation of a distinguished cooperating
committee of the American Bar Association, the National Conference on
Family Life which convened in Washington in May, 1948, indorsed the
further extension of courts of domestic relations with divorce jurisdiction.
20. Revised Stats. 1943, 42.307. And see Probation, April, 1947, p. 102.
21. Stats. 1945, 247.13.
22. 1940 Suppl. to Compiled Laws 1929, 12783-5. See Journal of the
American Judicature Society, April, 1946, p. 166; also Law and Con-




a threatened home before it is broken up; and after action is begun
the court may refer it if it appears that for the sake of a child in-
volved reconciliation ought to be attempted. In aid of reconcilia-
tion the court may make orders effective for a brief period, dur-
ing which divorce proceedings are suspended.23
A noteworthy experiment in the direction of socializing divorce
proceedings was recently attempted in Illinois.2 4 The Act proceeded
upon a declaration that the evils attendant upon the breaking up of
families by divorce constitute a serious threat to the general wel-
fare, health, morals and safety of the state, and recognized a causal
relationship between the disruption of the home and juvenile de-
pendency and delinquency, as well as increase in the financial bur-
den of the public because of failure to observe court orders for the
payment of support money. There was created in each judicial dis-
trict having a population of more than 500,000 a "divorce division,"
consisting of masters in chancery appointed, with "technical and
clerical assistants," under provisions differing from those relating
to other masters. To these officials all divorce proceedings and
matters involving the custody and support of children were to be
referred for investigation, hearing and recommendation. It was
made their duty to effect a reconciliation if possible; and to that end
they might seek aid from religious and social agencies. The State
Bureau of Public Welfare was expressly made available for investi-
gations. Unless the court should otherwise direct, payments for
child-support were to be made to and disbursed by the divorce
division. Under the classification by population the Act and various
implementing amendments of existing laws applied only to Cook
County (Chicago); and in Hunt v. Cook County, 76 N. E. 2nd, 48,
it was held that this group of laws was repugnant to the state's con-
stitutional prohibition of special legislation, since no valid distinc-
tion could be drawn between different judicial districts with respect
to the moral and social problems involved.
WHAT To Do ABOUT IT?
It is plain that conditions in Minnesota, in the field which has
been studied, are far from what they ought to be. Some advance
steps are at the command of the judges without legislative changes,
and they have unused facilities already at their disposal.
The "divorce proctor" plan is simple, need not be expensive,
23. Code of Civil Procedure, Deering, 1941. Sec. 1740-72.
24. Ill. Rev. Stats. 1947, Ch. 37, Sec. 105.
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and has evident advantages which have been demonstrated else-
where.
2 5
As this article is about to go to the printer there has been made
public a preliminary redraft of Article VI of the state constitution
which, with such changes as may be made after further considera-
tion, will be submitted to the State Commission on Revision of the
Constitution in June.26 From the standpoint of this study the note-
worthy features are Sections 5 and 16, and various provisions
relating to the status and jurisdiction of probate courts. Section 5
is as follows:
"A majority of the judges in any district having three or more
judges may provide that the court shall sit in divisions consisting
25. A useful suggestion comes from Iowa. District Judge Milton J.
Glenn, of Dubuque, has proposed to a committee of the State Bar Association
the following "Rule of Civil Procedure":
"The Judges of each Judicial District shall appoint for each
county in their district a Friend of the Court to act in divorce and
separate maintenance cases involving the custody of children. The
judges may appoint to said position the Probation Officer or Deputy
Probation Officer of said county or such other person as said Judges
deem qualified to perform the duties of the position. If the person
appointed is not an official or employee of the Court, the County, or
the State, said appointee shall receive such fee as the Court may fix
in each case, which fee shall be taxed as part of the Court costs in
the case.
"In said actions, a copy of each pleading filed in the case shall
be mailed to or served on said Friend of the Court by council at the
time said pleading is filed. When the issues are made up or when
either party has been adjudged to be in default, said Friend of the
Court shall make an investigation of the facts pertinent to the ques-
tion of the custody and welfare of the children in the event a divorce
or separate maintenance is decreed. A written report of the facts dis-
closed by said investigation shall be submitted to the Court before the
case is set for hearing.
"After said report has been submitted and not less than five
days prior to the hearing, the Court shall, in all cases where the
parties are within the jurisdiction of the Court, conduct a pre-trial
conference at which both parties shall appear. At said conference,
the Court shall undertake to bring about a reconciliation of the
parties. The attendance of the parties at said conference may be
compelled by Court order, even though either party be in default,
and counsel for the parties may also attend and participate in the
conference. A record of said conference shall be made if either party
demands it or if the Court so directs.
"In divorce and separate maintenance actions wherein the decree
contains an order for the payment of support money for children
and said payments are not made, the Friends of the Court shall have
authority to make an investigation of such failure to pay. When
said investigation indicates that the failure to pay may be willful, the
Friend of the Court shall report the result of the investigation
to the Court, and the Court may on its own motion issue a contempt
citation against the party required to make said payments."
26. See Preliminary Report on Revision of the Judiciary Article of
the Minnesota State Constitution, (1948) 32 Minn. L. Rev. 458.
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of one or more judges for the performance of designated classes
of judicial business." This would make specific and expressly con-
stitutional in the 2nd, 4th, 7th, 11th and 15th districts the authority
found in 484.34, Stats. 1945, above referred to, to centralize juris-
diction in divorce cases; but it is doubtful if the majority of judges
in any district would be more likely to act against the will of an as-
sociate than they are at present. Whether juvenile court jurisdic-
tion could be assumed in the 7th and 15th districts under present
laws is at least doubtful; and whether election by popular vote of
the juvenile court judge in Hennepin County might be affected
should receive careful consideration.
Section 16 provides that--"The legislature may confer juris-
diction over cases and proceedings relating to domestic relations
and the care or welfare of minors upon the court of probate or the
district court of any county or upon a court created for such pur-
poses." As to the creation of a new domestic relations court, this
seems to be covered by the proposed Sec. 127 but there may be an
advantage in explicit recognition of such a court as an appropriate
feature of our judicial system; and the section would do away
pro tanto with restrictions upon the legislature imposed by Art. IV,
Sec. 33, forbidding special legislation. The possible grant of juris-
diction in this field to the probate court is a noteworthy and im-
portant feature. It is quite in line with other provisions designed to
increase the dignity and authority of probate courts.
Sec. 7 provides that "For the complete determination of all
matters" relating to guardianship and incompetency the probate
court "shall have such additional jurisdiction, including trial by
jury, as may be prescribed by law." This would empower the legis-
lature to make the probate court a true juvenile court instead of a
fractional one, which it must remain so long as its power is limited
to orders for guardianship.
While these important changes are under official consideration
it does not seem wise to make specific recommendations here. With
constitutional revision impending this is a critical moment when
social-minded members of the Bench and Bar, and all who have
deeply at heart the welfare of our children, should make their in-
fluence felt.
"Until they are satisfied that no inadequacy of law or defect of
judicial machinery is contributing to the vast aggregate of heart-
27. Providing for such other courts inferior to the Supreme Court as the
legislature may establish by a majority vote instead of two-thirds, as now.
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ache and human misery represented by a half-million broken homes
a year, the Bench and Bar of America national, state and local, and
others interested in tle efficient administration of justice, should not
cease to scrutinize their statutes and judicial processes with that
end in view. ''2
28. Editorial article, Journal of the American Judicature Society, April,
1947, p. 181.
